A co-evolutionary model combined mixed-strategy and network adaptation by severing disassortative neighbors promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games

Kohei Miyaji, Jun Tanimoto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

A co-evolutionary model of both network and mixed strategy is proposed in this study. The assigned strategy si of agent i is defined by a real number ranging from 0 to 1, which probabilistically ordains a subsequent action of either cooperation or defection as the agent's offer. We assume a network dynamic to support or hamper the enhancement of cooperation, where an agent severs a link with the neighbor who has the most disassortative strategy. This means that an agent tends to maintain interactions only with neighbors that resemble the agent. A series of numerical simulations reveal that our “assortative grouping” framework enhances cooperation. Interestingly, when a low network adaptation speed and a certain degree of strategy copy error are presumed, phenomenal network heterogeneity evolves, one that realizes more significant cooperation as compared to error-free cases.

Original languageEnglish
Article number110603
JournalChaos, solitons and fractals
Volume143
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2021

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Mathematics(all)
  • Physics and Astronomy(all)
  • Applied Mathematics

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