A combinatorial auction protocol among versatile experts and amateurs

Takayuki Ito, Makoto Yokoo, Shigeo Matsubara

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Auctions have become an integral part of electronic commerce and a promising field for applying multi-agent technologies. Correctly judging the quality of auctioned items is often difficult for amateurs, in particular, in Internet auctions. However, experts can correctly judge the quality of items. In this situation, it is difficult to force experts to tell the truth and attain an efficient allocation since they have a clear advantage over amateurs; without some reward they cannot be expected to reveal their valuable information. In our previous work, we successfully develop such auction protocols under the following two cases: (1) a single-unit auction among experts and amateurs, and (2) a combinatorial auction among single-skilled experts and amateurs. In this paper we focus on versatile experts, who have interest in and expert knowledge of the qualities of several items. In the case of versatile experts, there are several problems, e.g., free riding problems, if we simply extend the previous VCG-style auction protocol. Thus, in this paper, we employ a PORF (price-oriented, rationing-free) protocol for designing our new protocol to realize a strategy-proof auction protocol for experts. In the protocol, the dominant strategy for experts is telling the truth. Also for amateurs, telling the truth is the best response when two or more experts select the dominant strategy. Furthermore, the protocol is false-name-proof.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagents Systems, AAMAS 2004
EditorsN.R. Jennings, C. Sierra, L. Sonenberg, M. Tambe
Pages378-385
Number of pages8
Volume1
Publication statusPublished - Sep 27 2004
EventProceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004 - New York, NY, United States
Duration: Jul 19 2004Jul 23 2004

Other

OtherProceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004
CountryUnited States
CityNew York, NY
Period7/19/047/23/04

Fingerprint

Network protocols
Electronic commerce
Internet

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Engineering(all)

Cite this

Ito, T., Yokoo, M., & Matsubara, S. (2004). A combinatorial auction protocol among versatile experts and amateurs. In N. R. Jennings, C. Sierra, L. Sonenberg, & M. Tambe (Eds.), Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagents Systems, AAMAS 2004 (Vol. 1, pp. 378-385)

A combinatorial auction protocol among versatile experts and amateurs. / Ito, Takayuki; Yokoo, Makoto; Matsubara, Shigeo.

Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagents Systems, AAMAS 2004. ed. / N.R. Jennings; C. Sierra; L. Sonenberg; M. Tambe. Vol. 1 2004. p. 378-385.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Ito, T, Yokoo, M & Matsubara, S 2004, A combinatorial auction protocol among versatile experts and amateurs. in NR Jennings, C Sierra, L Sonenberg & M Tambe (eds), Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagents Systems, AAMAS 2004. vol. 1, pp. 378-385, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004, New York, NY, United States, 7/19/04.
Ito T, Yokoo M, Matsubara S. A combinatorial auction protocol among versatile experts and amateurs. In Jennings NR, Sierra C, Sonenberg L, Tambe M, editors, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagents Systems, AAMAS 2004. Vol. 1. 2004. p. 378-385
Ito, Takayuki ; Yokoo, Makoto ; Matsubara, Shigeo. / A combinatorial auction protocol among versatile experts and amateurs. Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagents Systems, AAMAS 2004. editor / N.R. Jennings ; C. Sierra ; L. Sonenberg ; M. Tambe. Vol. 1 2004. pp. 378-385
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