A comment on "International Cooperation for Sale"

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Abstract

We reexamine the analysis of Barrett (2001), that explores the size of a self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Barrett stresses that the key feature to realize the self-enforcing agreement is asymmetries among countries, but we get the following results; certain condition that usually does not hold is required for the Barrett's solution, so it is necessary to reconsider the model settings.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume8
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1 2006

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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