A comment on ‘the anti-paradox of cooperation: diversity may pay!’

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Abstract

A recent study analytically investigates the stability of a public good coalition assuming unlimited types of players that differ in benefits and costs of providing public goods. They show that, if there is a positive covariance between benefit and cost parameters of coalition members, the size of a stable coalition cannot be larger than three. This comment further proves that if the above assumption is made to all players, coalition members always have high abatement benefits and costs.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)246-248
Number of pages3
JournalApplied Economics Letters
Volume28
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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