A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange with multiple indivisible goods under lexicographic preferences

Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Core-selection is a crucial property of social choice functions, or rules, in social choice literature. It is also desirable to address the incentive of agents to cheat by misreporting their preferences. This paper investigates an exchange problem where each agent may have multiple indivisible goods, agents' preferences over sets of goods are assumed to be lexicographic, and side payments are not allowed. We propose an exchange rule called augmented top-trading-cycles (ATTC) procedure based on the original TTC procedure. We first show that the ATTC procedure is core-selecting. We then show that finding a beneficial misreport under the ATTC procedure is NP-hard. Under the ATTC procedure, we finally clarify the relationship between preference misreport and splitting, which is a different type of manipulation.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015
PublisherAI Access Foundation
Pages907-913
Number of pages7
Volume2
ISBN (Electronic)9781577357001
Publication statusPublished - Jun 1 2015
Event29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015 - Austin, United States
Duration: Jan 25 2015Jan 30 2015

Other

Other29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015
CountryUnited States
CityAustin
Period1/25/151/30/15

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Artificial Intelligence

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