A mean-field vaccination game scheme to analyze the effect of a single vaccination strategy on a two-strain epidemic spreading

Md Rajib Arefin, K. M.Ariful Kabir, Jun Tanimoto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We propose a mean-field vaccination game framework that combines two distinct processes: The simultaneous spreading of two strains of an influenza-like disease, and the adoption of vaccination based on evolutionary game theory presuming an infinite and well-mixed population. The vaccine is presumed to be imperfect such that it shows better efficacy against the original (resident) strain rather than the new one (mutant). The vaccination-decision takes place at the beginning of an epidemic season and depends upon the vaccine-effectiveness along with the cost. Additionally, we explore a situation if the original strain continuously converts to a new strain through the process of mutation. With the aid of numerical experiments, we explore the impact of vaccinating behavior on a specific strain prevalence. Our results suggest that the emergence of vaccinators can create the possibility of infection-prevalence of the new strain if the vaccine cannot bestow a considerable level of efficiency against that strain. On the other hand, the resident strain can continue to dominate under large-scale vaccine avoidance. Moreover, in the case of continuous mutation, the vaccine efficacy against the new strain plays a pivotal role to control the disease prevalence. We successfully obtain phase diagrams, displaying the infected fraction with each strain, final epidemic size, vaccination coverage, and average social payoff considering two-different strategy-update rules and provide a comprehensive discussion to get an encompassing idea, justifying how the vaccinating behavior can affect the spread of a disease having two strains. Highlights-We build a mean-field vaccination game scheme to analyze the effect of an imperfect vaccine on a two-strain epidemic spreading taking into account individuals' vaccination behavior.-En masse vaccine avoidance can enhance the possibility of the original strain prevalence.-Propensity for vaccination can create the possibility of infection by the new strain if the vaccine is unable to provide a considerable level of efficiency against that strain.

Original languageEnglish
Article number033501
JournalJournal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment
Volume2020
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2020

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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