A multiple power analysis breaks the advanced version of the randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure against side channel attacks

K. Okeya, K. Sakurai

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that the advanced version of the randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure against side channel attacks is vulnerable to a multiple power analysis attack, a new kind of side channel attack, under distinguishability between addition and doubling. The side channel attack takes advantage of information leaked during execution of a cryptographic procedure. The randomized addition-subtraction chains countermeasure was proposed by E. Oswald and M. Aigner (see Lect. Notes in Comp. Sci., vol.2162, p.39-50, 2001), and is based on a random decision inserted into computations. The countermeasure has two versions; the basic version and the advanced version. The basic version has been proved to be vulnerable to a side channel attack. This is due to a shrinkage of states for randomization if a bit of the secret scalar is zero. However, the advanced version does not have such a shrinkage. The multiple power analysis uses plural AD sequences, which are sequences of additions and doublings, and obtained by the distinguishability and measurements. The multiple power analysis relates the AD sequences to each other, and deduces the secret scalar. A point of the multiple power analysis against the advanced version is that two different states are combined, and regarded as the same state. This provides a shrinkage of states if a bit of the secret scalar is zero.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2003 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2003
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages175-178
Number of pages4
ISBN (Electronic)0780377990, 9780780377998
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2003
Event2003 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2003 - Paris, France
Duration: Mar 31 2003Apr 4 2003

Publication series

NameProceedings - 2003 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2003

Other

Other2003 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2003
CountryFrance
CityParis
Period3/31/034/4/03

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Information Systems
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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