A new approach to the pareto stable matching problem

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In two-sided matching markets, the concept of stability proposed by Gale and Shapley is one of the most important solution concepts. In this paper, we consider a problem related to stability of a matching in a two-sided matching market with indifferences. It is known that stability does not guarantee Pareto efficiency in a two-sided matching market with indifferences. However, Erdil and Ergin proved that there always exists a stable and Pareto efficient matching in a many-to-one matching market with indifferences and gave a polynomial-time algorithm for finding it. Later on, Chen proved that there always exists a stable and Pareto efficient matching in a many-to-many matching market with indifferences and gave a polynomial-time algorithm for finding it. In this paper, we propose a new approach to the problem of finding a stable and Pareto efficient matching in a many-to-many matching market with indifferences. Our algorithm is an alternative proof of the existence of a stable and Pareto efficient matching in a many-to-many matching market with indifferences.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)851-862
Number of pages12
JournalMathematics of Operations Research
Volume39
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2014

Fingerprint

Stable Matching
Matching Problem
Pareto
Many to many
Polynomials
Polynomial-time Algorithm
Pareto Efficiency
Many to one
Solution Concepts
Market
Stable matching
Matching problem
Matching markets
Indifference
Alternatives

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Mathematics(all)
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Management Science and Operations Research

Cite this

A new approach to the pareto stable matching problem. / Kamiyama, Naoyuki.

In: Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol. 39, No. 3, 08.2014, p. 851-862.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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