Abstract
Coalition formation is a key aspect of automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Various solution concepts (such as the Shapley value, core, least core, and nucleolus) have been proposed. In this paper, we demonstrate how these concepts are vulnerable to various kinds of manipulations in open anonymous environments such as the Internet. These manipulations include submitting false names (one acting as many), collusion (many acting as one), and the hiding of skills. To address these threats, we introduce a new solution concept called the anonymity-proof core, which is robust to these manipulations. We show that the anonymity-proof core is characterized by certain simple axiomatic conditions. Furthermore, we show that by relaxing these conditions, we obtain a concept called the least anonymity-proof core, which is guaranteed to be non-empty.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence - Joint JSAI 2005 Workshop Post-Proceedings |
| Publisher | Springer Verlag |
| Pages | 53-64 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| ISBN (Print) | 3540354700, 9783540354703 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 1 2006 |
| Event | Joint JSAI 2005 Workshop on New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence - Kitakyushu City, Japan Duration: Jun 13 2005 → Jun 14 2005 |
Publication series
| Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
|---|---|
| Volume | 4012 LNAI |
| ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Other
| Other | Joint JSAI 2005 Workshop on New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence |
|---|---|
| Country | Japan |
| City | Kitakyushu City |
| Period | 6/13/05 → 6/14/05 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Theoretical Computer Science
- Computer Science(all)
Cite this
A new solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environments. / Yokoo, Makoto; Conitzer, Vincent; Sandholm, Tuomas; Ohta, Naoki; Iwasaki, Atsushi.
New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence - Joint JSAI 2005 Workshop Post-Proceedings. Springer Verlag, 2006. p. 53-64 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 4012 LNAI).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - A new solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
AU - Conitzer, Vincent
AU - Sandholm, Tuomas
AU - Ohta, Naoki
AU - Iwasaki, Atsushi
PY - 2006/1/1
Y1 - 2006/1/1
N2 - Coalition formation is a key aspect of automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Various solution concepts (such as the Shapley value, core, least core, and nucleolus) have been proposed. In this paper, we demonstrate how these concepts are vulnerable to various kinds of manipulations in open anonymous environments such as the Internet. These manipulations include submitting false names (one acting as many), collusion (many acting as one), and the hiding of skills. To address these threats, we introduce a new solution concept called the anonymity-proof core, which is robust to these manipulations. We show that the anonymity-proof core is characterized by certain simple axiomatic conditions. Furthermore, we show that by relaxing these conditions, we obtain a concept called the least anonymity-proof core, which is guaranteed to be non-empty.
AB - Coalition formation is a key aspect of automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Various solution concepts (such as the Shapley value, core, least core, and nucleolus) have been proposed. In this paper, we demonstrate how these concepts are vulnerable to various kinds of manipulations in open anonymous environments such as the Internet. These manipulations include submitting false names (one acting as many), collusion (many acting as one), and the hiding of skills. To address these threats, we introduce a new solution concept called the anonymity-proof core, which is robust to these manipulations. We show that the anonymity-proof core is characterized by certain simple axiomatic conditions. Furthermore, we show that by relaxing these conditions, we obtain a concept called the least anonymity-proof core, which is guaranteed to be non-empty.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33746223981&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33746223981&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/11780496_6
DO - 10.1007/11780496_6
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:33746223981
SN - 3540354700
SN - 9783540354703
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 53
EP - 64
BT - New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence - Joint JSAI 2005 Workshop Post-Proceedings
PB - Springer Verlag
ER -