A new solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environments

Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Coalition formation is a key aspect of automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Various solution concepts (such as the Shapley value, core, least core, and nucleolus) have been proposed. In this paper, we demonstrate how these concepts are vulnerable to various kinds of manipulations in open anonymous environments such as the Internet. These manipulations include submitting false names (one acting as many), collusion (many acting as one), and the hiding of skills. To address these threats, we introduce a new solution concept called the anonymity-proof core, which is robust to these manipulations. We show that the anonymity-proof core is characterized by certain simple axiomatic conditions. Furthermore, we show that by relaxing these conditions, we obtain a concept called the least anonymity-proof core, which is guaranteed to be non-empty.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationNew Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence - Joint JSAI 2005 Workshop Post-Proceedings
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages53-64
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)3540354700, 9783540354703
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2006
EventJoint JSAI 2005 Workshop on New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence - Kitakyushu City, Japan
Duration: Jun 13 2005Jun 14 2005

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume4012 LNAI
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

OtherJoint JSAI 2005 Workshop on New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence
CountryJapan
CityKitakyushu City
Period6/13/056/14/05

Fingerprint

Coalitional Games
Solution Concepts
Anonymity
Manipulation
Internet
Automated Negotiation
Coalition Formation
Nucleolus
Collusion
Shapley Value
Coalitions
Demonstrate
Concepts

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Yokoo, M., Conitzer, V., Sandholm, T., Ohta, N., & Iwasaki, A. (2006). A new solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environments. In New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence - Joint JSAI 2005 Workshop Post-Proceedings (pp. 53-64). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 4012 LNAI). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11780496_6

A new solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environments. / Yokoo, Makoto; Conitzer, Vincent; Sandholm, Tuomas; Ohta, Naoki; Iwasaki, Atsushi.

New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence - Joint JSAI 2005 Workshop Post-Proceedings. Springer Verlag, 2006. p. 53-64 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 4012 LNAI).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Yokoo, M, Conitzer, V, Sandholm, T, Ohta, N & Iwasaki, A 2006, A new solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environments. in New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence - Joint JSAI 2005 Workshop Post-Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 4012 LNAI, Springer Verlag, pp. 53-64, Joint JSAI 2005 Workshop on New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence, Kitakyushu City, Japan, 6/13/05. https://doi.org/10.1007/11780496_6
Yokoo M, Conitzer V, Sandholm T, Ohta N, Iwasaki A. A new solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environments. In New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence - Joint JSAI 2005 Workshop Post-Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2006. p. 53-64. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/11780496_6
Yokoo, Makoto ; Conitzer, Vincent ; Sandholm, Tuomas ; Ohta, Naoki ; Iwasaki, Atsushi. / A new solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environments. New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence - Joint JSAI 2005 Workshop Post-Proceedings. Springer Verlag, 2006. pp. 53-64 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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