A new strategy-proof greedy-allocation combinatorial auction protocol and its extension to open ascending auction protocol

Takayuki Ito, Makoto Yokoo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Shigeo Matsubara

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper proposes a new combinatorial auction protocol called Average-Max-Minimal-Bundle (AM-MB) protocol. The characteristics of the AM-MB protocol are as follows: (i) it is strategyproof. i.e., truth-telling is a dominant strategy, (ii) the computational overhead is very low, since it allocates bundles greedily thereby avoiding an explicit combinatorial optimization problem, and (iii) it can obtain higher social surplus and revenue than can the Max-Minimal-Bundle (M-MB) protocol, which also satisfies (i) and (ii). Furthermore, this paper extends the AM-MB protocol to an open ascending-price protocol in which straightforward bidding is an ex-post Nash equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages261-266
Number of pages6
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1 2005
Event20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-05/IAAI-05 - Pittsburgh, PA, United States
Duration: Jul 9 2005Jul 13 2005

Other

Other20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-05/IAAI-05
CountryUnited States
CityPittsburgh, PA
Period7/9/057/13/05

Fingerprint

Combinatorial optimization

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Ito, T., Yokoo, M., Iwasaki, A., & Matsubara, S. (2005). A new strategy-proof greedy-allocation combinatorial auction protocol and its extension to open ascending auction protocol. 261-266. Paper presented at 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-05/IAAI-05, Pittsburgh, PA, United States.

A new strategy-proof greedy-allocation combinatorial auction protocol and its extension to open ascending auction protocol. / Ito, Takayuki; Yokoo, Makoto; Iwasaki, Atsushi; Matsubara, Shigeo.

2005. 261-266 Paper presented at 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-05/IAAI-05, Pittsburgh, PA, United States.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

Ito, T, Yokoo, M, Iwasaki, A & Matsubara, S 2005, 'A new strategy-proof greedy-allocation combinatorial auction protocol and its extension to open ascending auction protocol', Paper presented at 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-05/IAAI-05, Pittsburgh, PA, United States, 7/9/05 - 7/13/05 pp. 261-266.
Ito T, Yokoo M, Iwasaki A, Matsubara S. A new strategy-proof greedy-allocation combinatorial auction protocol and its extension to open ascending auction protocol. 2005. Paper presented at 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-05/IAAI-05, Pittsburgh, PA, United States.
Ito, Takayuki ; Yokoo, Makoto ; Iwasaki, Atsushi ; Matsubara, Shigeo. / A new strategy-proof greedy-allocation combinatorial auction protocol and its extension to open ascending auction protocol. Paper presented at 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-05/IAAI-05, Pittsburgh, PA, United States.6 p.
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