A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the problem of assigning agents having preferences to projects with capacities and lower quotas. For this problem, Monte and Tumennasan proposed a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism, called the serial dictatorship with project closures. In this paper, we show that the serial dictatorship with project closures can be extended to a more general setting.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)559-561
Number of pages3
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume41
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this