A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures

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9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the problem of assigning agents having preferences to projects with capacities and lower quotas. For this problem, Monte and Tumennasan proposed a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism, called the serial dictatorship with project closures. In this paper, we show that the serial dictatorship with project closures can be extended to a more general setting.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)559-561
Number of pages3
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume41
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

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