A progress report on subliminal-free channels

Mike Burmester, Yvo G. Desraedt, Toshiya Itoh, Kouichi Sakurai, Hiroki Shizuya, Moti Yung

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Subliminal channels are closely related to covert channelsand are used to hide secret information. They abuse the communications resource. Subliminal channels can be introduced in many cryptographicsystems, and exploit the inherent randomness of the systems. For example, secret information can be hidden in the randomness of the authenticators of an authentication system. Similarly secret information can be hidden in the randomness (of the prover or verifier) of both zeroknowledge proof systems and signature systems. To establish a subliminal channel the cryptosystem is abused, that is, used in a different way and for a different purpose than intended by its designer. A particularly obnoxious type of subliminal channel may be activated by abortive halting. For state-of-the-art security, it may be desirable to detect, and if possible prevent, subliminal channels. In this paper we address the problem of whether it is possible to develop (and if so, how) appropriate techniquesfor detecting or preventing the use of such channels. Several such techniques have already been proposed in the literature, and are suitable for many systems. We review these. We also consider recent developments, in particular with regards to the formal security requirements and their impact on research.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInformation Hiding - 1st International Workshop, Proceedings
EditorsRoss Anderson
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages157-168
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)9783540619963
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 1996
Event1st International Workshop on Information Hiding, 1996 - Cambridge, United Kingdom
Duration: May 30 1996Jun 1 1996

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume1174
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other1st International Workshop on Information Hiding, 1996
CountryUnited Kingdom
CityCambridge
Period5/30/966/1/96

Fingerprint

Authentication
Cryptography
Randomness
Communication
Zero-knowledge
Proof System
Cryptosystem
Signature
Resources
Requirements

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Burmester, M., Desraedt, Y. G., Itoh, T., Sakurai, K., Shizuya, H., & Yung, M. (1996). A progress report on subliminal-free channels. In R. Anderson (Ed.), Information Hiding - 1st International Workshop, Proceedings (pp. 157-168). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 1174). Springer Verlag.

A progress report on subliminal-free channels. / Burmester, Mike; Desraedt, Yvo G.; Itoh, Toshiya; Sakurai, Kouichi; Shizuya, Hiroki; Yung, Moti.

Information Hiding - 1st International Workshop, Proceedings. ed. / Ross Anderson. Springer Verlag, 1996. p. 157-168 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 1174).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Burmester, M, Desraedt, YG, Itoh, T, Sakurai, K, Shizuya, H & Yung, M 1996, A progress report on subliminal-free channels. in R Anderson (ed.), Information Hiding - 1st International Workshop, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 1174, Springer Verlag, pp. 157-168, 1st International Workshop on Information Hiding, 1996, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 5/30/96.
Burmester M, Desraedt YG, Itoh T, Sakurai K, Shizuya H, Yung M. A progress report on subliminal-free channels. In Anderson R, editor, Information Hiding - 1st International Workshop, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 1996. p. 157-168. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
Burmester, Mike ; Desraedt, Yvo G. ; Itoh, Toshiya ; Sakurai, Kouichi ; Shizuya, Hiroki ; Yung, Moti. / A progress report on subliminal-free channels. Information Hiding - 1st International Workshop, Proceedings. editor / Ross Anderson. Springer Verlag, 1996. pp. 157-168 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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