A repeated game approach for analyzing the collusion on selective forwarding in multihop wireless networks

Dong Hao, Xiaojuan Liao, Avishek Adhikari, Kouichi Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In multihop wireless networks (MWNs), the selective forwarding attack is a special case of denial of service attack. In this attack, the malicious wireless nodes only forward a subset of the received packets, but drop the others. This attack becomes more severe if multiple attackers exist and collude together to disrupt the normal functioning of the secure protocols. By colluding, each attacker can even only drop a little packets, but the overall loss of the path will be high. However, most prior researches on selective forwarding attacks assume the attackers do not collude with each other. Furthermore, the previous works also lack of comprehensive security analysis. In this paper, by utilizing the game theoretic approach, we analyze the collusion in selective forwarding attacks. We first put forward a sub-route oriented punish and reward scheme, and propose an multi-attacker repeated colluding game. Then by static and dynamic analysis of this colluding attack game, we find the sub-game equilibriums which indicate the attackers' optimal attack strategies. Based on the analysis result, we establish a security policies for multihop wireless networks, to threaten and detect the malicious insider nodes which collude with each other to launch the selective forwarding attacks.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2125-2137
Number of pages13
JournalComputer Communications
Volume35
Issue number17
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 1 2012

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Wireless networks
Static analysis
Dynamic analysis
Network protocols
Denial-of-service attack

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

A repeated game approach for analyzing the collusion on selective forwarding in multihop wireless networks. / Hao, Dong; Liao, Xiaojuan; Adhikari, Avishek; Sakurai, Kouichi; Yokoo, Makoto.

In: Computer Communications, Vol. 35, No. 17, 01.10.2012, p. 2125-2137.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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