A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids

Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kenji Terada

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

18 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper develops a new ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol that has the following characteristics: (i) it has an open format, and (ii) sincere bidding is an equilibrium strategy even if the marginal values of each agent can increase and agents can submit false-name bids. False-name bids are bids submitted under fictitious names such as multiple e-mail addresses, which can be done easily on the Internet. This is the first protocol that has both of these characteristics. Our simulation results indicate that the developed protocol obtains a social surplus close to Pareto efficient.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)23-39
Number of pages17
JournalDecision Support Systems
Volume39
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 1 2005

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Management Information Systems
  • Information Systems
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Information Systems and Management

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