A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids

Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kenji Terada

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper develops a new ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol that has following characteristics: (i) it has an open format, (ii) sincere bidding is an equilibrium strategy even if the marginal utilities of each agent can increase and agents can submit false-name bids. False-name bids are bids submitted under fictitious names such as multiple e-mail addresses, which can be done easily in the Internet. This is the first protocol that has these two characteristics. We show that our new protocol outperforms an existing protocol, which satisfies (ii), with respect to the social surplus and the seller's revenue.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)334-342
Number of pages9
JournalTransactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence
Volume19
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1 2004

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Artificial Intelligence

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