A stochastic Pairwise Fermi rule modified by utilizing the average in payoff differences of neighbors leads to increased network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma games

Keisuke Nagashima, Jun Tanimoto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a 2 × 2 prisoner's dilemma (PD) game, network reciprocity is one of the mechanisms for increasing social viscosity, which leads to a cooperative equilibrium. The Pairwise Fermi (PW-Fermi) rule has been accepted as an updating protocol, as its stochasticity is similar to the real-world human decision-making process. In this paper, we elucidated a modification to the PW-Fermi rule by utilizing the averaged payoff difference instead of the simple payoff difference between a focal agent and their neighbors. This led to a significantly enhanced level of network reciprocity. The mechanism of this enhancement is clarified by discussing the concepts of the enduring period (END) and the expanding period (EXP).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)661-669
Number of pages9
JournalApplied Mathematics and Computation
Volume361
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 15 2019

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computational Mathematics
  • Applied Mathematics

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