A study of a quadruple co-evolutionary model and its reciprocity phase for various Prisoner's Dilemma game

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We present and numerically investigate a quadruple co-evolutionary model for 2 × 2 Prisoner's Dilemma games which allows not only for agents to adopt strategy (Cooperation C or Defection D) and for network topology, but also for the probability of link rewiring that controls the speed of network evolution and the updating rule itself. The results of a series of simulations reveal that C agents in a coexisting phase increase their rewiring probability to avoid neighboring D agents' exploitation through the Game Exit Option. This evolutionary process leads most agents to adopt pairwise updating even though Imitation Max update adopted by all agents brings a higher payoff.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)401-417
Number of pages17
JournalInternational Journal of Modern Physics C
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - Apr 1 2011


All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Mathematical Physics
  • Physics and Astronomy(all)
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics

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