A study on emergence of alternating reciprocity in a 2 × 2 game with 2-length memory strategy

Jun Tanimoto, Hiroki Sagara

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

41 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It is recognized that bilateral cooperation (C), a reward-state in other words, emergently comes up in a 2 × 2 prisoner's dilemma game, if you assume a strategy set with a memory concept. Also observed is a mixture state of cooperation (C) and defect (D), saint- and temptation-state in other words, to obtain a higher payoff than R (R reciprocity) in a hero or leader game that is a chicken-type dilemma game; this phenomenon is called alternating reciprocity (AR) or ST reciprocity. Observing a holistic 2 × 2 game world including trivial games and various dilemma games, where 2-length memory and infinite interactions are assumed, the paper reports on the specific mechanism of AR. It is observed there are three different phases relating to AR, which can be explained by the stress of the dilemma.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)728-737
Number of pages10
JournalBioSystems
Volume90
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 1 2007

Fingerprint

Reciprocity
Game
Dilemma
Data storage equipment
Saints
Reward
Chickens
Defects
Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Trivial
Strategy
Interaction
Prisoner Dilemma

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

A study on emergence of alternating reciprocity in a 2 × 2 game with 2-length memory strategy. / Tanimoto, Jun; Sagara, Hiroki.

In: BioSystems, Vol. 90, No. 3, 01.11.2007, p. 728-737.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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