TY - GEN
T1 - A study on social diffusive impacts of a novel car-navigation-system sharing individual information in urban traffic systems
AU - Sagara, Hiroki
AU - Tanimoto, Jun
PY - 2007/12/1
Y1 - 2007/12/1
N2 - As one of the authors' trials to establish a model for human-environment- social Systems, a multi-agent simulation model to deal with urban traffic congestion problems involving automobiles embedded with several strategies of car navigation systems (CNS), has been presented. A shortest time route with route information sharing strategy (ST-RIS) is believed to be one of the solutions for a novel CNS based on bilateral information shared among automobile agents. The question of which strategy is most appropriate for solving urban traffic congestion can be seen as a social dilemma, since the social holistic utility is opposite to each agent's individual utility. The presented model shows that this social dilemma is observed as a typical Chicken type dilemma, or as a typical Minority Game, where an agent who has adopted a minority strategy can earn more utility than other strategies. Consequently, the model has illustrated that ST-pRIS, which is a further advanced strategic form of ST-RIS, where only partial information is shared among agents, has a moderate potential to be diffused in a society from the viewpoint of the evolutionary game theory.
AB - As one of the authors' trials to establish a model for human-environment- social Systems, a multi-agent simulation model to deal with urban traffic congestion problems involving automobiles embedded with several strategies of car navigation systems (CNS), has been presented. A shortest time route with route information sharing strategy (ST-RIS) is believed to be one of the solutions for a novel CNS based on bilateral information shared among automobile agents. The question of which strategy is most appropriate for solving urban traffic congestion can be seen as a social dilemma, since the social holistic utility is opposite to each agent's individual utility. The presented model shows that this social dilemma is observed as a typical Chicken type dilemma, or as a typical Minority Game, where an agent who has adopted a minority strategy can earn more utility than other strategies. Consequently, the model has illustrated that ST-pRIS, which is a further advanced strategic form of ST-RIS, where only partial information is shared among agents, has a moderate potential to be diffused in a society from the viewpoint of the evolutionary game theory.
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U2 - 10.1109/CEC.2007.4424557
DO - 10.1109/CEC.2007.4424557
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:79955302397
SN - 1424413400
SN - 9781424413409
T3 - 2007 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2007
SP - 836
EP - 842
BT - 2007 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2007
T2 - 2007 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2007
Y2 - 25 September 2007 through 28 September 2007
ER -