Abstract
As one of the authors' trials to establish a model for human-environment- social Systems, a multi-agent simulation model to deal with urban traffic congestion problems involving automobiles embedded with several strategies of car navigation systems (CNS), has been presented. A shortest time route with route information sharing strategy (ST-RIS) is believed to be one of the solutions for a novel CNS based on bilateral information shared among automobile agents. The question of which strategy is most appropriate for solving urban traffic congestion can be seen as a social dilemma, since the social holistic utility is opposite to each agent's individual utility. The presented model shows that this social dilemma is observed as a typical Chicken type dilemma, or as a typical Minority Game, where an agent who has adopted a minority strategy can earn more utility than other strategies. Consequently, the model has illustrated that ST-pRIS, which is a further advanced strategic form of ST-RIS, where only partial information is shared among agents, has a moderate potential to be diffused in a society from the viewpoint of the evolutionary game theory.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 2007 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2007 |
| Pages | 836-842 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 1 2007 |
| Event | 2007 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2007 - , Singapore Duration: Sep 25 2007 → Sep 28 2007 |
Publication series
| Name | 2007 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2007 |
|---|
Other
| Other | 2007 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2007 |
|---|---|
| Country | Singapore |
| Period | 9/25/07 → 9/28/07 |
Fingerprint
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Artificial Intelligence
- Software
- Theoretical Computer Science
Cite this
A study on social diffusive impacts of a novel car-navigation-system sharing individual information in urban traffic systems. / Sagara, Hiroki; Tanimoto, Jun.
2007 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2007. 2007. p. 836-842 4424557 (2007 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2007).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - A study on social diffusive impacts of a novel car-navigation-system sharing individual information in urban traffic systems
AU - Sagara, Hiroki
AU - Tanimoto, Jun
PY - 2007/12/1
Y1 - 2007/12/1
N2 - As one of the authors' trials to establish a model for human-environment- social Systems, a multi-agent simulation model to deal with urban traffic congestion problems involving automobiles embedded with several strategies of car navigation systems (CNS), has been presented. A shortest time route with route information sharing strategy (ST-RIS) is believed to be one of the solutions for a novel CNS based on bilateral information shared among automobile agents. The question of which strategy is most appropriate for solving urban traffic congestion can be seen as a social dilemma, since the social holistic utility is opposite to each agent's individual utility. The presented model shows that this social dilemma is observed as a typical Chicken type dilemma, or as a typical Minority Game, where an agent who has adopted a minority strategy can earn more utility than other strategies. Consequently, the model has illustrated that ST-pRIS, which is a further advanced strategic form of ST-RIS, where only partial information is shared among agents, has a moderate potential to be diffused in a society from the viewpoint of the evolutionary game theory.
AB - As one of the authors' trials to establish a model for human-environment- social Systems, a multi-agent simulation model to deal with urban traffic congestion problems involving automobiles embedded with several strategies of car navigation systems (CNS), has been presented. A shortest time route with route information sharing strategy (ST-RIS) is believed to be one of the solutions for a novel CNS based on bilateral information shared among automobile agents. The question of which strategy is most appropriate for solving urban traffic congestion can be seen as a social dilemma, since the social holistic utility is opposite to each agent's individual utility. The presented model shows that this social dilemma is observed as a typical Chicken type dilemma, or as a typical Minority Game, where an agent who has adopted a minority strategy can earn more utility than other strategies. Consequently, the model has illustrated that ST-pRIS, which is a further advanced strategic form of ST-RIS, where only partial information is shared among agents, has a moderate potential to be diffused in a society from the viewpoint of the evolutionary game theory.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79955302397&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=79955302397&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/CEC.2007.4424557
DO - 10.1109/CEC.2007.4424557
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:79955302397
SN - 1424413400
SN - 9781424413409
T3 - 2007 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2007
SP - 836
EP - 842
BT - 2007 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2007
ER -