Achieving sustainable cooperation in generalized prisoner's dilemma with observation errors

Fuuki Shigenaka, Shun Yamamoto, Motohide Seki, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

A repeated game is a formal model for analyzing cooperation in long-term relationships. The case where each player observes her opponent's action with some observation errors (imperfect private monitoring) is difficult to analyze, and existing works show that cooperative relations can be sustainable only in ideal situations. We deal with a generic problem that can model both the prisoner's dilemma and the team production problem. We examine a situation with an additional action that is dominated by another action. By adding this seemingly irrelevant action, players can achieve sustainable cooperative relations far beyond the ideal situations. Moreover, for a two-player case, the obtained welfare matches a theoretical upper bound.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages1323-1324
Number of pages2
ISBN (Electronic)9781450342391
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2016
Event15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: May 9 2016May 13 2016

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Other

Other15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016
CountrySingapore
CitySingapore
Period5/9/165/13/16

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

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  • Cite this

    Shigenaka, F., Yamamoto, S., Seki, M., Sekiguchi, T., Iwasaki, A., & Yokoo, M. (2016). Achieving sustainable cooperation in generalized prisoner's dilemma with observation errors. In AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (pp. 1323-1324). (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).