Achieving sustainable cooperation in generalized Prisoner's dilemma with observation errors

Fuuki Shigenaka, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

A repeated game is a formal model for analyzing cooperation in long-term relationships, e.g., in the prisoner's dilemma. Although the case where each player observes her opponent's action with some observation errors (imperfect private monitoring) is difficult to analyze, a special type of an equilibrium called belief-free equilibrium is identified to make the analysis in private monitoring tractable. However, existing works using a belief-free equilibrium show that cooperative relations can be sustainable only in ideal situations. We deal with a generic problem that can model both the prisoner's dilemma and the team production problem. We examine a situation with an additional action that is dominated by another action. To our surprise, by adding this seemingly irrelevant action, players can achieve sustainable cooperative relations far beyond the ideal situations. More specifically, we identify a class of strategies called one-shot punishment strategy that can constitute a belief-free equilibrium in a wide range of parameters. Moreover, for a two-player case, the obtained welfare matches a theoretical upper bound.

Original languageEnglish
Pages677-683
Number of pages7
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2017
Event31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017 - San Francisco, United States
Duration: Feb 4 2017Feb 10 2017

Other

Other31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017
CountryUnited States
CitySan Francisco
Period2/4/172/10/17

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Monitoring

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Shigenaka, F., Sekiguchi, T., Iwasaki, A., & Yokoo, M. (2017). Achieving sustainable cooperation in generalized Prisoner's dilemma with observation errors. 677-683. Paper presented at 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017, San Francisco, United States.

Achieving sustainable cooperation in generalized Prisoner's dilemma with observation errors. / Shigenaka, Fuuki; Sekiguchi, Tadashi; Iwasaki, Atsushi; Yokoo, Makoto.

2017. 677-683 Paper presented at 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017, San Francisco, United States.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

Shigenaka, F, Sekiguchi, T, Iwasaki, A & Yokoo, M 2017, 'Achieving sustainable cooperation in generalized Prisoner's dilemma with observation errors' Paper presented at 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017, San Francisco, United States, 2/4/17 - 2/10/17, pp. 677-683.
Shigenaka F, Sekiguchi T, Iwasaki A, Yokoo M. Achieving sustainable cooperation in generalized Prisoner's dilemma with observation errors. 2017. Paper presented at 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017, San Francisco, United States.
Shigenaka, Fuuki ; Sekiguchi, Tadashi ; Iwasaki, Atsushi ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Achieving sustainable cooperation in generalized Prisoner's dilemma with observation errors. Paper presented at 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017, San Francisco, United States.7 p.
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