TY - JOUR
T1 - Allocation rules for multi-choice games with a permission tree structure
AU - Lowing, David
N1 - Funding Information:
We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for their comments on our work. We also thank Sylvain Béal, Stéphane Gonzalez, Kevin Techer and Philippe Solal for useful comments. We are grateful to Encarnación Algaba and the EURO21 organizing committee for letting us present this paper at the EURO21 conference, Eric Bahel for letting us present this paper at the International Conference on Social Choice and Voting Theory, and the SING16 organizing committee for letting us present this paper at the European Meeting on Game Theory (2021). The author wants to thank GRDF (Gaz Réseau Distribution France) for their financial support through the ANRT (Association Nationale Recherche Technologie) doctoral program CIFRE (Conventions Industrielles de Formation par la REcherche).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2023/1
Y1 - 2023/1
N2 - We consider multi-choice cooperative games with a permission tree structure. Multi-choice games are a generalization of cooperative transferable utility games in which each player has several activity levels. In addition, a permission tree structure models a situation in which a player needs permission from another player to cooperate. In this framework, the influence of a permission structure on the possibility of cooperation may have several interpretations depending on the context. In this paper, we investigate several of these interpretations and introduce for each of them a new allocation rule that we axiomatically characterize.
AB - We consider multi-choice cooperative games with a permission tree structure. Multi-choice games are a generalization of cooperative transferable utility games in which each player has several activity levels. In addition, a permission tree structure models a situation in which a player needs permission from another player to cooperate. In this framework, the influence of a permission structure on the possibility of cooperation may have several interpretations depending on the context. In this paper, we investigate several of these interpretations and introduce for each of them a new allocation rule that we axiomatically characterize.
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U2 - 10.1007/s10479-022-04953-4
DO - 10.1007/s10479-022-04953-4
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85137861356
SN - 0254-5330
VL - 320
SP - 261
EP - 291
JO - Annals of Operations Research
JF - Annals of Operations Research
IS - 1
ER -