An average-case budget-non-negative double auction protocol

Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We develop a new strategy-proof double auction protocol characterized as average-case budget-non-negative. It is well-known that there is no strategy-proof double auction protocol that satisfies Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and budget-balance simultaneously. The existing approach is to give up Pareto efficiency or strategy-proofness by enforcing budget-balance or budget-positive as a hard constraint. We propose a new direction to slightly relax the budget-non-negative condition. Although this protocol might incur loss or profit in some cases, it is guaranteed not to exceed the predetermined amount of loss. Simulation results show that this protocol can be budget-non-negative on average and achieve social surplus that is very close to being Pareto efficient by setting parameters appropriately.

Original languageEnglish
Pages104-111
Number of pages8
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2002
EventProceedings of the 1st International Joint Conference on: Autonomous Agents adn Multiagent Systems - Bologna, Italy
Duration: Jul 15 2002Jul 19 2002

Other

OtherProceedings of the 1st International Joint Conference on: Autonomous Agents adn Multiagent Systems
CountryItaly
CityBologna
Period7/15/027/19/02

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Engineering(all)

Cite this

Sakurai, Y., & Yokoo, M. (2002). An average-case budget-non-negative double auction protocol. 104-111. Paper presented at Proceedings of the 1st International Joint Conference on: Autonomous Agents adn Multiagent Systems, Bologna, Italy.