An efficient countermeasure against side channel attacks for pairing computation

Masaaki Shirase, Tsuyoshi Takagi, Eiji Okamoto

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Pairing-based cryptosystems have been widely researched, and several efficient hardware implementations of pairings have also been proposed. However, side channel attacks (SCAs) are serious attacks on hardware implementations. Whelan et al. pointed out that pairings except the η T pairing might not be vulnerable against SCAs by setting the secret point to the first parameter [25]. This paper deals with SCAs for the η T pairing over . To our knowledge, the randomized-projective-coordinate method has the smallest overhead among all countermeasures against SCAs for the η T pairing. The cost of that overhead is 3nM, where M is the cost of a multiplication in . In this paper, we propose another countermeasure based on random value additions (x p ∈+∈λ) and (y p ∈+∈λ), where P∈=∈(x p ,y p ) is the input point, and λ is a random value in . The countermeasure using the random value addition was relatively slow in the case of the scalar multiplication of elliptic curve cryptosystems. However, in the case of the η T pairing, we can construct an efficient countermeasure due to the form of the function for a point P∈=∈(x p ,y p ). The overhead of our proposed scheme is just 0.5nM, which is a reduction of more than 75% compared with the randomized-projective-coordinate method.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInformation Security Practice and Experience - 4th International Conference, ISPEC 2008, Proceedings
Pages290-303
Number of pages14
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 7 2008
Event4th Information Security Practice and Experience Conference, ISPEC 2008 - Sydney, NSW, Australia
Duration: Apr 21 2008Apr 23 2008

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume4991 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other4th Information Security Practice and Experience Conference, ISPEC 2008
CountryAustralia
CitySydney, NSW
Period4/21/084/23/08

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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    Shirase, M., Takagi, T., & Okamoto, E. (2008). An efficient countermeasure against side channel attacks for pairing computation. In Information Security Practice and Experience - 4th International Conference, ISPEC 2008, Proceedings (pp. 290-303). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 4991 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79104-1_21