An Improvement on the Linear Algebraic Attack for the Indeterminate Equation Encryption Scheme

Yasuhiko Ikematsu, Koichiro Akiyama, Tsuyoshi Takagi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

At SAC2017, Akiyama et al. proposed the indeterminate equation encryption scheme whose security is based on a solution problem of indeterminate equation. It is an extension of algebraic surface encryption scheme. A public key X for this scheme is a polynomial in two variables over a finite ring. Akiyama et al. also proposed two attacks, the linear algebraic attack (LAA) and the key recovery attack (KRA), by using the lattice structure associated with this scheme. In this paper, we give an improvement on LAA. Also we explain the relation between our improvement and the improvement on LAA proposed by Xagawa and examine parameters that those attacks fail by experiments. As a result, we conclude that if the total degree of the public key X is one, then KRA is more efficient than LAA and if that of X is two, then LAA is more efficient than KRA.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of 2018 International Symposium on Information Theory and Its Applications, ISITA 2018
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages389-393
Number of pages5
ISBN (Electronic)9784885523182
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 8 2019
Externally publishedYes
Event15th International Symposium on Information Theory and Its Applications, ISITA 2018 - Singapore, Singapore
Duration: Oct 28 2018Oct 31 2018

Publication series

NameProceedings of 2018 International Symposium on Information Theory and Its Applications, ISITA 2018

Conference

Conference15th International Symposium on Information Theory and Its Applications, ISITA 2018
CountrySingapore
CitySingapore
Period10/28/1810/31/18

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Information Systems

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