TY - JOUR
T1 - Analysis of individual strategies for artificial and natural immunity with imperfectness and durability of protection
AU - Ariful Kabir, K. M.
AU - Tanimoto, Jun
N1 - Funding Information:
This study was supported partially by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from JSPS, Japan, KAKENHI (Grant No. 19KK0262), SCAT (Support Center for Advanced Telecommunications Technology) Research Foundation, and I/O Data Foundation awarded to Professor Tanimoto. We would like to express our gratitude to them.
Funding Information:
This study was supported partially by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from JSPS, Japan, KAKENHI (Grant No. 19KK0262), SCAT (Support Center for Advanced Telecommunications Technology) Research Foundation, and I/O Data Foundation awarded to Professor Tanimoto. We would like to express our gratitude to them.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Elsevier Ltd
PY - 2021/1/21
Y1 - 2021/1/21
N2 - As protection against infectious disease, immunity is conferred by one of two main defense mechanisms, namely (i) resistance generated by previous infection (known as natural immunity) or (ii) by being vaccinated (known as artificial immunity). To analyze, a modified SVIRS epidemic model is established that integrates the effects of the durability of protection and imperfectness in the framework of the human decision-making process as a vaccination game. It is supposed that immunized people become susceptible again when their immunity expires, which depends on the duration of immunity. The current theory for most voluntary vaccination games assumes that seasonal diseases such as influenza are controlled by a temporal vaccine, the immunity of which lasts for only one season. Also, a novel perspective is established involving an individual's immune system combined with self-interest to take the vaccine and natural immunity obtained from infection by coupling a disease-spreading model with an evolutionary game approach over a long period. Numerical simulations show that the longer attenuation helps significantly to control the spread of disease. Also discovered is the entire mechanism of active and passive immunities, in the sense of how they coexist with natural and artificial immunity. Thus, the prospect of finding the optimal strategy for eradicating a disease could help in the design of effective vaccination campaigns and policies.
AB - As protection against infectious disease, immunity is conferred by one of two main defense mechanisms, namely (i) resistance generated by previous infection (known as natural immunity) or (ii) by being vaccinated (known as artificial immunity). To analyze, a modified SVIRS epidemic model is established that integrates the effects of the durability of protection and imperfectness in the framework of the human decision-making process as a vaccination game. It is supposed that immunized people become susceptible again when their immunity expires, which depends on the duration of immunity. The current theory for most voluntary vaccination games assumes that seasonal diseases such as influenza are controlled by a temporal vaccine, the immunity of which lasts for only one season. Also, a novel perspective is established involving an individual's immune system combined with self-interest to take the vaccine and natural immunity obtained from infection by coupling a disease-spreading model with an evolutionary game approach over a long period. Numerical simulations show that the longer attenuation helps significantly to control the spread of disease. Also discovered is the entire mechanism of active and passive immunities, in the sense of how they coexist with natural and artificial immunity. Thus, the prospect of finding the optimal strategy for eradicating a disease could help in the design of effective vaccination campaigns and policies.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110531
DO - 10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110531
M3 - Article
C2 - 33129951
AN - SCOPUS:85095425681
VL - 509
JO - Journal of Theoretical Biology
JF - Journal of Theoretical Biology
SN - 0022-5193
M1 - 110531
ER -