Anonymity-proof shapley value: Compact and computationally efficient solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environment

Naoki Ohta, Yasufumi Sato, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Coalition formation is an important capability for automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Coalitional game theory provides a number of solution concepts for this. However, recent research has revealed that these traditional solution concepts are vulnerable to various manipulations in open anonymous environments such as the Internet. To address this, previous work has developed a solution concept called the anonymity-proof core, which is robust against such manipulations. That work also developed a method for compactly representing the anonymity-proof core. However, the required computational and representational costs are still huge. In this paper, we develop a new solution concept which we call the anonymity-proof Shapley value. We show that the anonymity-proof Shapley value is characterized by certain simple axiomatic conditions, always exists, and is uniquely determined. The computational and representational costs of the anonymity-proof Shapley value are drastically smaller than those of existing anonymity-proof solution concepts.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)181-196
Number of pages16
JournalComputer Software
Volume26
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1 2009

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Game theory
Costs
Internet

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software

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Anonymity-proof shapley value : Compact and computationally efficient solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environment. / Ohta, Naoki; Sato, Yasufumi; Iwasaki, Atsushi; Yokoo, Makoto; Conitzer, Vincent.

In: Computer Software, Vol. 26, No. 4, 01.12.2009, p. 181-196.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Ohta, Naoki ; Sato, Yasufumi ; Iwasaki, Atsushi ; Yokoo, Makoto ; Conitzer, Vincent. / Anonymity-proof shapley value : Compact and computationally efficient solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environment. In: Computer Software. 2009 ; Vol. 26, No. 4. pp. 181-196.
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