TY - GEN

T1 - Anonymity-proof Shapley value

T2 - 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2008

AU - Ohta, Naoki

AU - Conitzer, Vincent

AU - Satoh, Yasufumi

AU - Iwasaki, Atsushi

AU - Yokoo, Makoto

PY - 2008/1/1

Y1 - 2008/1/1

N2 - Coalition formation is an important capability for automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Coalitional game theory provides a number of solution concepts for this. However, recent research has revealed that these traditional solution concepts are vulnerable to various manipulations in open anonymous environments such as the Internet. To address this, previous work has developed a solution concept called the anonymity-proof core, which is robust against such manipulations. That work also developed a method for compactly representing the anonymity-proof core. However, the required computational and representational costs are still huge. In this paper, we develop a new solution concept which we call the anonymity-proof Shapley value. We show that the anonymity-proof Shapley value is characterized by certain simple axiomatic conditions, always exists, and is uniquely determined. The computational and representational costs of the anonymity-proof Shapley value are drastically smaller than those of existing anonymity-proof solution concepts.

AB - Coalition formation is an important capability for automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Coalitional game theory provides a number of solution concepts for this. However, recent research has revealed that these traditional solution concepts are vulnerable to various manipulations in open anonymous environments such as the Internet. To address this, previous work has developed a solution concept called the anonymity-proof core, which is robust against such manipulations. That work also developed a method for compactly representing the anonymity-proof core. However, the required computational and representational costs are still huge. In this paper, we develop a new solution concept which we call the anonymity-proof Shapley value. We show that the anonymity-proof Shapley value is characterized by certain simple axiomatic conditions, always exists, and is uniquely determined. The computational and representational costs of the anonymity-proof Shapley value are drastically smaller than those of existing anonymity-proof solution concepts.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84899909246&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84899909246&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84899909246

SN - 9781605604701

T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

SP - 909

EP - 916

BT - 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2008

PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)

Y2 - 12 May 2008 through 16 May 2008

ER -