Anonymity-proof Shapley value: Extending Shapley value for coalitional games in open environments

Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Yasufumi Satoh, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Coalition formation is an important capability for automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Coalitional game theory provides a number of solution concepts for this. However, recent research has revealed that these traditional solution concepts are vulnerable to various manipulations in open anonymous environments such as the Internet. To address this, previous work has developed a solution concept called the anonymity-proof core, which is robust against such manipulations. That work also developed a method for compactly representing the anonymity-proof core. However, the required computational and representational costs are still huge. In this paper, we develop a new solution concept which we call the anonymity-proof Shapley value. We show that the anonymity-proof Shapley value is characterized by certain simple axiomatic conditions, always exists, and is uniquely determined. The computational and representational costs of the anonymity-proof Shapley value are drastically smaller than those of existing anonymity-proof solution concepts.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2008
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages909-916
Number of pages8
ISBN (Print)9781605604701
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2008
Event7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2008 - Estoril, Portugal
Duration: May 12 2008May 16 2008

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume2
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Other

Other7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2008
CountryPortugal
CityEstoril
Period5/12/085/16/08

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

Cite this

Ohta, N., Conitzer, V., Satoh, Y., Iwasaki, A., & Yokoo, M. (2008). Anonymity-proof Shapley value: Extending Shapley value for coalitional games in open environments. In 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2008 (pp. 909-916). (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS; Vol. 2). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).