The use of algorithms in pricing strategies has received special attention among competition law scholars. There is an increasing number of scholars who argue that the pricing algorithms, facilitated by increased access to Big Data, could move in the direction of collusive price setting. Though this claim is being made, there are various responses. On the one hand, scholars point out that current artificial intelligence is not yet well-developed to trigger that result. On the other hand, scholars argue that algorithms may have other pricing results rather than collusion. Despite the uncertainty that collusive price could be the result of the use of pricing algorithms, a plethora of scholars are developing views on how to deal with collusive price setting caused by algorithms. The most obvious choice is to work with the legal instruments currently available. Beyond this choice, scholars also suggest constructing a new rule of reason. This rule would allow us to judge whether an algorithm could be used or not. Other scholars focus on developing a test environment. Still other scholars seek solutions outside competition law and elaborate on how privacy regulation or transparency reducing regulation could counteract a collusive outcome. Besides looking at law, there are also scholars arguing that technology will allow us to respond to the excesses of pricing algorithms. It is the purpose of this chapter to give a detailed overview of this debate on algorithms, price setting and competition law.