Bank Directorships and Bidder's Returns in Japanese Takeovers

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The study investigated 145 Japanese domestic mergers and tender offers during 1981 to 1998, and found close to zero 3-day abnormal returns for bidders but significantly positive returns in a large window period. No positive relationship exists between the bank borrowing level and the bidder's cumulative abnormal return. However, when using the bank directorship to measure bank control, the result of study found that bidder's abnormal returns were significantly and adversely associated with bank directorship. The results also suggest that the costs of Japanese bank-firm relations may benefits due to changes in the macroeconomic and legal environment.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)169-184
Number of pages16
JournalThe Japanese journal of administrative science
Volume20
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 30 2007

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Abnormal returns
Legal environment
Mergers
Tender offers
Borrowing
Costs
Macroeconomics
Cumulative abnormal return
Japanese banks

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Bank Directorships and Bidder's Returns in Japanese Takeovers. / Yeh, Tsung-ming.

In: The Japanese journal of administrative science, Vol. 20, No. 2, 30.06.2007, p. 169-184.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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