Abstract
We develop strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols for non-quasi-linear utilities. One almost universal assumption in auction theory literature is that each bidder has quasi-linear utility. However, in practice, a bidder might have some kind of financial condition including budget constraints. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) protocol is designed to be truthful under the quasi-linear assumption and will break down if this assumption does not hold. We show with a simple modification, the VCG can handle non-quasi-linear utilities. However, there are possibilities that the modified VCG sacrifices significant efficiency loss, since it only uses the gross utilities for determining tentative allocation and payments. Also, it has been shown that the VCG is vulnerable to a false-name bid which is a new type of cheating on the Internet. To improve efficiency without collecting the entire utility functions and guarantee falsename-proofness, we develop a false-name-proof open ascending auction protocol.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Proceedings - 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT 2008 |
| Pages | 417-423 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 1 2008 |
| Event | 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT 2008 - Sydney, NSW, Australia Duration: Dec 9 2008 → Dec 12 2008 |
Publication series
| Name | Proceedings - 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT 2008 |
|---|
Other
| Other | 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT 2008 |
|---|---|
| Country | Australia |
| City | Sydney, NSW |
| Period | 12/9/08 → 12/12/08 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Artificial Intelligence
- Software
Cite this
Beyond quasi-linear utility : Strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols. / Sakurai, Yuko; Saito, Yasumasa; Iwasaki, Atsushi; Yokoo, Makoto.
Proceedings - 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT 2008. 2008. p. 417-423 4740659 (Proceedings - 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT 2008).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Beyond quasi-linear utility
T2 - Strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols
AU - Sakurai, Yuko
AU - Saito, Yasumasa
AU - Iwasaki, Atsushi
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
PY - 2008/12/1
Y1 - 2008/12/1
N2 - We develop strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols for non-quasi-linear utilities. One almost universal assumption in auction theory literature is that each bidder has quasi-linear utility. However, in practice, a bidder might have some kind of financial condition including budget constraints. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) protocol is designed to be truthful under the quasi-linear assumption and will break down if this assumption does not hold. We show with a simple modification, the VCG can handle non-quasi-linear utilities. However, there are possibilities that the modified VCG sacrifices significant efficiency loss, since it only uses the gross utilities for determining tentative allocation and payments. Also, it has been shown that the VCG is vulnerable to a false-name bid which is a new type of cheating on the Internet. To improve efficiency without collecting the entire utility functions and guarantee falsename-proofness, we develop a false-name-proof open ascending auction protocol.
AB - We develop strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols for non-quasi-linear utilities. One almost universal assumption in auction theory literature is that each bidder has quasi-linear utility. However, in practice, a bidder might have some kind of financial condition including budget constraints. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) protocol is designed to be truthful under the quasi-linear assumption and will break down if this assumption does not hold. We show with a simple modification, the VCG can handle non-quasi-linear utilities. However, there are possibilities that the modified VCG sacrifices significant efficiency loss, since it only uses the gross utilities for determining tentative allocation and payments. Also, it has been shown that the VCG is vulnerable to a false-name bid which is a new type of cheating on the Internet. To improve efficiency without collecting the entire utility functions and guarantee falsename-proofness, we develop a false-name-proof open ascending auction protocol.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=62949109516&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=62949109516&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/WIIAT.2008.217
DO - 10.1109/WIIAT.2008.217
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:62949109516
SN - 9780769534961
T3 - Proceedings - 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT 2008
SP - 417
EP - 423
BT - Proceedings - 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT 2008
ER -