Bitcoin Block Withholding Attack: Analysis and Mitigation

Samiran Bag, Sushmita Ruj, Kouichi Sakurai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

36 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We address two problems: First, we study a variant of block withholding (BWH) attack in Bitcoins and second, we propose solutions to prevent all existing types of BWH attacks in Bitcoins. We analyze the strategies of a selfish Bitcoin miner who in connivance with one pool attacks another pool and receives reward from the former mining pool for attacking the latter. We name this attack as 'sponsored block withholding attack.' We present detailed quantitative analysis of the monetary incentive that a selfish miner can earn by adopting this strategy under different scenarios. We prove that under certain conditions, the attacker can maximize her revenue by adopting some strategies and by utilizing her computing power wisely. We also show that an attacker may use this strategy for attacking both the pools for earning higher amount of incentives. More importantly, we present a strategy that can effectively counter block withholding attack in any mining pool. First, we propose a generic scheme that uses cryptographic commitment schemes to counter BWH attack. Then, we suggest an alternative implementation of the same scheme using hash function. Our scheme protects a pool from rogue miners as well as rogue pool administrators. The scheme and its variant defend against BWH attack by making it impossible for the miners to distinguish between a partial proof of work and a complete proof of work. The scheme is so designed that the administrator cannot cheat on the entire pool. The scheme can be implemented by making minor changes to existing Bitcoin protocol. We also analyze the security of the scheme.

Original languageEnglish
Article number7728010
Pages (from-to)1967-1978
Number of pages12
JournalIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Volume12
Issue number8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2017

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Miners
Hash functions
Chemical analysis

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Bitcoin Block Withholding Attack : Analysis and Mitigation. / Bag, Samiran; Ruj, Sushmita; Sakurai, Kouichi.

In: IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, Vol. 12, No. 8, 7728010, 08.2017, p. 1967-1978.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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