Characterization of strategy-proof, revenue monotone combinatorial auction mechanisms and connection with false-name-proofness

Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule and a payment rule. There have been several studies on characterizing strategy-proof allocation rules. In particular, conditions called weak-monotonicity has been identified as a full characterization of them. On the other hand, revenue monotonicity is recognized as one of the desirable properties. A combinatorial auction mechanism is revenue monotone if a seller's revenue is guaranteed to weakly increase as the number of bidders grows. Though the property is quite reasonable, there exists virtually no work on the characterization. In this paper, we identified a simple condition called summation-monotonicity. We then proved that we can construct a strategy-proof, revenue monotone mechanism if and only if the allocation rule satisfies weak-monotonicity and summation-monotonicity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to characterize revenue monotone allocation rules. In addition, we shed light on a connection between revenue monotonicity and false-name-proofness. In fact, we proved that, assuming a natural condition, revenue monotonicity is equivalent to false-name-proofness for single-item auctions.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics - 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Proceedings
Pages561-568
Number of pages8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1 2009
Event5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2009 - Rome, Italy
Duration: Dec 14 2009Dec 18 2009

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5929 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2009
CountryItaly
CityRome
Period12/14/0912/18/09

Fingerprint

Combinatorial Auctions
Monotonicity
Monotone
Summation
Auctions
False
Strategy
If and only if

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Todo, T., Iwasaki, A., & Yokoo, M. (2009). Characterization of strategy-proof, revenue monotone combinatorial auction mechanisms and connection with false-name-proofness. In Internet and Network Economics - 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Proceedings (pp. 561-568). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 5929 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_56

Characterization of strategy-proof, revenue monotone combinatorial auction mechanisms and connection with false-name-proofness. / Todo, Taiki; Iwasaki, Atsushi; Yokoo, Makoto.

Internet and Network Economics - 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Proceedings. 2009. p. 561-568 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 5929 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Todo, T, Iwasaki, A & Yokoo, M 2009, Characterization of strategy-proof, revenue monotone combinatorial auction mechanisms and connection with false-name-proofness. in Internet and Network Economics - 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5929 LNCS, pp. 561-568, 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2009, Rome, Italy, 12/14/09. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_56
Todo T, Iwasaki A, Yokoo M. Characterization of strategy-proof, revenue monotone combinatorial auction mechanisms and connection with false-name-proofness. In Internet and Network Economics - 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Proceedings. 2009. p. 561-568. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_56
Todo, Taiki ; Iwasaki, Atsushi ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Characterization of strategy-proof, revenue monotone combinatorial auction mechanisms and connection with false-name-proofness. Internet and Network Economics - 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Proceedings. 2009. pp. 561-568 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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