Abstract
A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule and a payment rule. There have been several studies on characterizing strategy-proof allocation rules. In particular, conditions called weak-monotonicity has been identified as a full characterization of them. On the other hand, revenue monotonicity is recognized as one of the desirable properties. A combinatorial auction mechanism is revenue monotone if a seller's revenue is guaranteed to weakly increase as the number of bidders grows. Though the property is quite reasonable, there exists virtually no work on the characterization. In this paper, we identified a simple condition called summation-monotonicity. We then proved that we can construct a strategy-proof, revenue monotone mechanism if and only if the allocation rule satisfies weak-monotonicity and summation-monotonicity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to characterize revenue monotone allocation rules. In addition, we shed light on a connection between revenue monotonicity and false-name-proofness. In fact, we proved that, assuming a natural condition, revenue monotonicity is equivalent to false-name-proofness for single-item auctions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Internet and Network Economics - 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Proceedings |
| Pages | 561-568 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 1 2009 |
| Event | 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2009 - Rome, Italy Duration: Dec 14 2009 → Dec 18 2009 |
Publication series
| Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
|---|---|
| Volume | 5929 LNCS |
| ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Other
| Other | 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2009 |
|---|---|
| Country | Italy |
| City | Rome |
| Period | 12/14/09 → 12/18/09 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Theoretical Computer Science
- Computer Science(all)
Cite this
Characterization of strategy-proof, revenue monotone combinatorial auction mechanisms and connection with false-name-proofness. / Todo, Taiki; Iwasaki, Atsushi; Yokoo, Makoto.
Internet and Network Economics - 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Proceedings. 2009. p. 561-568 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 5929 LNCS).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Characterization of strategy-proof, revenue monotone combinatorial auction mechanisms and connection with false-name-proofness
AU - Todo, Taiki
AU - Iwasaki, Atsushi
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
PY - 2009/12/1
Y1 - 2009/12/1
N2 - A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule and a payment rule. There have been several studies on characterizing strategy-proof allocation rules. In particular, conditions called weak-monotonicity has been identified as a full characterization of them. On the other hand, revenue monotonicity is recognized as one of the desirable properties. A combinatorial auction mechanism is revenue monotone if a seller's revenue is guaranteed to weakly increase as the number of bidders grows. Though the property is quite reasonable, there exists virtually no work on the characterization. In this paper, we identified a simple condition called summation-monotonicity. We then proved that we can construct a strategy-proof, revenue monotone mechanism if and only if the allocation rule satisfies weak-monotonicity and summation-monotonicity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to characterize revenue monotone allocation rules. In addition, we shed light on a connection between revenue monotonicity and false-name-proofness. In fact, we proved that, assuming a natural condition, revenue monotonicity is equivalent to false-name-proofness for single-item auctions.
AB - A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule and a payment rule. There have been several studies on characterizing strategy-proof allocation rules. In particular, conditions called weak-monotonicity has been identified as a full characterization of them. On the other hand, revenue monotonicity is recognized as one of the desirable properties. A combinatorial auction mechanism is revenue monotone if a seller's revenue is guaranteed to weakly increase as the number of bidders grows. Though the property is quite reasonable, there exists virtually no work on the characterization. In this paper, we identified a simple condition called summation-monotonicity. We then proved that we can construct a strategy-proof, revenue monotone mechanism if and only if the allocation rule satisfies weak-monotonicity and summation-monotonicity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to characterize revenue monotone allocation rules. In addition, we shed light on a connection between revenue monotonicity and false-name-proofness. In fact, we proved that, assuming a natural condition, revenue monotonicity is equivalent to false-name-proofness for single-item auctions.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=76649118164&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_56
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_56
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:76649118164
SN - 3642108407
SN - 9783642108402
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 561
EP - 568
BT - Internet and Network Economics - 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Proceedings
ER -