Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions

Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule that defines the allocation of goods for each agent, and a payment rule that defines the payment of each winner. There have been several studies on characterizing strategy- proof allocation rules. In particular, a condition called weak- monotonicity has been identified as a full characterization of strategy-proof allocation rules. More specifically, for an allocation rule, there exists an appropriate payment rule so that the mechanism becomes strategy-proof if and only if it satisfies weak-monotonicity. In this paper, we identify a condition called sub-additivity which characterizes false-name-proof allocation rules. False- name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness, by assuming that a bidder can submit multiple bids under fictitious identifiers. As far as the authors are aware, this is the first attempt to characterize false-name-proof allocation rules. We can utilize this characterization for developing a new false-name-proof mechanism, since we can concentrate on designing an allocation rule. As long as the allocation rule satisfies weak-monotonicity and sub-additivity, there always exists an appropriate payment rule. Furthermore, by utilizing the sub-additivity condition, we can easily verify whether a mechanism is false-name-proof. To our surprise, we found that two mechanisms, which were believed to be false-name- proof, do not satisfy sub-additivity; they are not false-name- proof. As demonstrated in these examples, our characterization is quite useful for mechanism verification.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication8th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2009, AAMAS 2009
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages958-965
Number of pages8
Volume2
ISBN (Print)9781615673346
Publication statusPublished - 2009
Event8th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2009, AAMAS 2009 - Budapest, Hungary
Duration: May 10 2009May 15 2009

Other

Other8th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2009, AAMAS 2009
CountryHungary
CityBudapest
Period5/10/095/15/09

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

Cite this

Todo, T., Iwasaki, A., Yokoo, M., & Sakurai, Y. (2009). Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions. In 8th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2009, AAMAS 2009 (Vol. 2, pp. 958-965). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).