Co-evolution model of networks and strategy in a 2 × 2 game emerges cooperation

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A 2×2 game model implemented by co-evolution of both networks and strategies Is established. Several numerical experiments considering various 2×2 game classes, including Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), Chicken, Leader, and Hero, reveal that the proposed co-evolution mechanism can solve dilemmas in the PD game class. The result of solving a dilemma is the development of mutual-cooperation reciprocity (R reciprocity), which arises through the emergence of several cooperative hub agents, which have many links in a heterogeneous and assortative social network. However, the co-evolution mechanism seems counterproductive in case of the Leader and Hero game classes, where alternating reciprocity (ST reciprocity) is more demanding. It is also suggested that the assortative and cluster coefficients of a network affect the emergence of cooperation for R reciprocity.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2008
Pages117-122
Number of pages6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 14 2008
Event2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2008 - Hong Kong, China
Duration: Jun 1 2008Jun 6 2008

Publication series

Name2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2008

Other

Other2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2008
CountryChina
CityHong Kong
Period6/1/086/6/08

Fingerprint

Coevolution
Reciprocity
Game
Dilemma
Experiments
Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Prisoners' Dilemma
Model
Social Networks
Numerical Experiment
Strategy
Coefficient
Class

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Theoretical Computer Science

Cite this

Tanimoto, J. (2008). Co-evolution model of networks and strategy in a 2 × 2 game emerges cooperation. In 2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2008 (pp. 117-122). [4630785] (2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2008). https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2008.4630785

Co-evolution model of networks and strategy in a 2 × 2 game emerges cooperation. / Tanimoto, Jun.

2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2008. 2008. p. 117-122 4630785 (2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2008).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Tanimoto, J 2008, Co-evolution model of networks and strategy in a 2 × 2 game emerges cooperation. in 2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2008., 4630785, 2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2008, pp. 117-122, 2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2008, Hong Kong, China, 6/1/08. https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2008.4630785
Tanimoto J. Co-evolution model of networks and strategy in a 2 × 2 game emerges cooperation. In 2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2008. 2008. p. 117-122. 4630785. (2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2008). https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2008.4630785
Tanimoto, Jun. / Co-evolution model of networks and strategy in a 2 × 2 game emerges cooperation. 2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2008. 2008. pp. 117-122 (2008 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2008).
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