Coexistence of utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness in social choice

Julien Lesca, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The class of Groves mechanisms has been attracting much attention in mechanism design literature due to two attractive characteristics: utilitarian efficiency (also called social welfare maximization) and dominant strategy incentive compatibility. However, when strategic agents can create multiple fake identities and reveal more than one preference under them, a refined characteristic called false-name-proofness is required. Utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness are incompatible in combinatorial auctions, if we also have individual rationality as a desired condition. However, although individual rationality is strongly desirable, if participation is mandatory due to social norms or reputations, a mechanism without individual rationality can be sustained. In this paper we investigate the relationship between utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness in a social choice environment with monetary transfers. We show that in our modelization no mechanism simultaneously satisfies utilitarian efficiency, false-name-proofness, and individual rationality. Considering this fact, we ignore individual rationality and design various mechanisms that simultaneously satisfy the other two properties. We also compare our different mechanisms in terms of the distance to individual rationality. Finally we illustrate our mechanisms on a facility location problem.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages1201-1208
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781634391313
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2014
Event13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014 - Paris, France
Duration: May 5 2014May 9 2014

Publication series

Name13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014
Volume2

Other

Other13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014
CountryFrance
CityParis
Period5/5/145/9/14

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Lesca, J., Todo, T., & Yokoo, M. (2014). Coexistence of utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness in social choice. In 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014 (pp. 1201-1208). (13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014; Vol. 2). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).

Coexistence of utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness in social choice. / Lesca, Julien; Todo, Taiki; Yokoo, Makoto.

13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2014. p. 1201-1208 (13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014; Vol. 2).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Lesca, J, Todo, T & Yokoo, M 2014, Coexistence of utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness in social choice. in 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014. 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014, vol. 2, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), pp. 1201-1208, 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014, Paris, France, 5/5/14.
Lesca J, Todo T, Yokoo M. Coexistence of utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness in social choice. In 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS). 2014. p. 1201-1208. (13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014).
Lesca, Julien ; Todo, Taiki ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Coexistence of utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness in social choice. 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2014. pp. 1201-1208 (13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014).
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