TY - GEN
T1 - Competitive Auctions and Envy-Freeness for Group of Agents
AU - Todo, Taiki
AU - Iwasaki, Atsushi
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgments. This work is partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grants JP17H00761 and JP17H04695. The authors thank Takayuki Mouri for his helpful comments and discussions. All errors are our own.
Publisher Copyright:
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - In mechanism design, fairness is one of the central criteria for analyzing mechanisms. Recently, a new fairness concept called envy-freeness of a group toward a group (GtG-EFness) has received attention, which requires that no group of agents envies any other group. In this paper, we consider GtG-EFness in more general combinatorial auctions, including several subclasses of the multi-unit auction domain (unit-demand, diminishing marginal values, and all-or-nothing), and reveal the tight bound of the competitive ratios. In particular, we prove that the tight bound of the competitive ratio is 1/k (where k is the number of items) for the general combinatorial auction domain. We also clarify the relationship with Walrasian equilibria and conclude that no group envies any other group in any Walrasian equilibrium.
AB - In mechanism design, fairness is one of the central criteria for analyzing mechanisms. Recently, a new fairness concept called envy-freeness of a group toward a group (GtG-EFness) has received attention, which requires that no group of agents envies any other group. In this paper, we consider GtG-EFness in more general combinatorial auctions, including several subclasses of the multi-unit auction domain (unit-demand, diminishing marginal values, and all-or-nothing), and reveal the tight bound of the competitive ratios. In particular, we prove that the tight bound of the competitive ratio is 1/k (where k is the number of items) for the general combinatorial auction domain. We also clarify the relationship with Walrasian equilibria and conclude that no group envies any other group in any Walrasian equilibrium.
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-26176-4_45
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-26176-4_45
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85070240383
SN - 9783030261757
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 541
EP - 553
BT - Computing and Combinatorics - 25th International Conference, COCOON 2019, Proceedings
A2 - Du, Ding-Zhu
A2 - Duan, Zhenhua
A2 - Tian, Cong
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 25th International Computing and Combinatorics Conference, COCOON 2019
Y2 - 29 July 2019 through 31 July 2019
ER -