Competitive Auctions and Envy-Freeness for Group of Agents

Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In mechanism design, fairness is one of the central criteria for analyzing mechanisms. Recently, a new fairness concept called envy-freeness of a group toward a group (GtG-EFness) has received attention, which requires that no group of agents envies any other group. In this paper, we consider GtG-EFness in more general combinatorial auctions, including several subclasses of the multi-unit auction domain (unit-demand, diminishing marginal values, and all-or-nothing), and reveal the tight bound of the competitive ratios. In particular, we prove that the tight bound of the competitive ratio is 1/k (where k is the number of items) for the general combinatorial auction domain. We also clarify the relationship with Walrasian equilibria and conclude that no group envies any other group in any Walrasian equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationComputing and Combinatorics - 25th International Conference, COCOON 2019, Proceedings
EditorsDing-Zhu Du, Zhenhua Duan, Cong Tian
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages541-553
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)9783030261757
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2019
Event25th International Computing and Combinatorics Conference, COCOON 2019 - Xi'an, China
Duration: Jul 29 2019Jul 31 2019

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume11653 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference25th International Computing and Combinatorics Conference, COCOON 2019
CountryChina
CityXi'an
Period7/29/197/31/19

Fingerprint

Auctions
Walrasian Equilibrium
Combinatorial Auctions
Competitive Ratio
Fairness
Mechanism Design
Unit
Diminishing

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Todo, T., Iwasaki, A., & Yokoo, M. (2019). Competitive Auctions and Envy-Freeness for Group of Agents. In D-Z. Du, Z. Duan, & C. Tian (Eds.), Computing and Combinatorics - 25th International Conference, COCOON 2019, Proceedings (pp. 541-553). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11653 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26176-4_45

Competitive Auctions and Envy-Freeness for Group of Agents. / Todo, Taiki; Iwasaki, Atsushi; Yokoo, Makoto.

Computing and Combinatorics - 25th International Conference, COCOON 2019, Proceedings. ed. / Ding-Zhu Du; Zhenhua Duan; Cong Tian. Springer Verlag, 2019. p. 541-553 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11653 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Todo, T, Iwasaki, A & Yokoo, M 2019, Competitive Auctions and Envy-Freeness for Group of Agents. in D-Z Du, Z Duan & C Tian (eds), Computing and Combinatorics - 25th International Conference, COCOON 2019, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 11653 LNCS, Springer Verlag, pp. 541-553, 25th International Computing and Combinatorics Conference, COCOON 2019, Xi'an, China, 7/29/19. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26176-4_45
Todo T, Iwasaki A, Yokoo M. Competitive Auctions and Envy-Freeness for Group of Agents. In Du D-Z, Duan Z, Tian C, editors, Computing and Combinatorics - 25th International Conference, COCOON 2019, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. 2019. p. 541-553. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26176-4_45
Todo, Taiki ; Iwasaki, Atsushi ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Competitive Auctions and Envy-Freeness for Group of Agents. Computing and Combinatorics - 25th International Conference, COCOON 2019, Proceedings. editor / Ding-Zhu Du ; Zhenhua Duan ; Cong Tian. Springer Verlag, 2019. pp. 541-553 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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