Compulsory licensing of technology and the essential facilities doctrine

Reiko Aoki, John Small

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider compulsory licensing of intellectual property as a remedy for anti-competitive practices. We identify aspects of intellectual property that could warrant a different remedy from those developed for access to physical essential facilities. Based on the analysis, we present a characterisation of optimal compulsory licensing for a simple market. We find that royalty payments offer a greater range of choices to a regulator than fixed fees. Thus, even though the marginal cost of supplying access to intellectual property is zero, some unit charging is likely to be efficient.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)13-29
Number of pages17
JournalInformation Economics and Policy
Volume16
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 1 2004

Fingerprint

market
cost
licencing
Licensing
Essential facilities
Intellectual property
Remedies
analysis
fee
royalty
Marginal cost
Payment
Fixed fee
Royalty
Warrants

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

Cite this

Compulsory licensing of technology and the essential facilities doctrine. / Aoki, Reiko; Small, John.

In: Information Economics and Policy, Vol. 16, No. 1, 01.03.2004, p. 13-29.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Aoki, Reiko ; Small, John. / Compulsory licensing of technology and the essential facilities doctrine. In: Information Economics and Policy. 2004 ; Vol. 16, No. 1. pp. 13-29.
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