Cooperatively securing network coding against pollution attacks with incentive mechanism

Yichao Xu, Kouichi Sakurai

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The availab ility of network system with network coding can suffer from malicious nodes intentionally corrupt the encoded packets. T he sit uat ion will get even worse when t here are self ish nodes that are unwilling to take the measure of securit y mechanism. In such situation, selfish nodes should be motivated to follow the protocol, and malicious nodes need to be detected. We integrate an efficient Homomorphic MAC with a lightweight non-repudiation transmission protocol which can not only detect the corrupted packets but also locate the malicious nodes. In order to deal with the selfish behavior, we propose an incentive scheme which can encourage the nodes to follow the protocol faithfully and detect the pollution attacks. In addition, we analyze the relationship between security and parameters of the protocol, which can help to choose the better parameters the system requires. From the evaluated results, we can see that our design can effectively defense against pollution attacks in the system with network coding with high security and good performance.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 6th International Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication, ICUIMC'12
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 8 2012
Event6th International Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication, ICUIMC'12 - Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Duration: Feb 20 2012Feb 22 2012

Other

Other6th International Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication, ICUIMC'12
CountryMalaysia
CityKuala Lumpur
Period2/20/122/22/12

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Information Systems

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