Core stability in hedonic games among friends and enemies: Impact of Neutrals

Kazunori Ota, Nathanaël Barrot, Anisse Ismaili, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate hedonic games under enemies aversion and friends appreciation, where every agent considers other agents as either a friend or an enemy. We extend these simple preferences by allowing each agent to also consider other agents to be neutral. Neutrals have no impact on her preference, as in a graphical hedonic game. Surprisingly, we discover that neutral agents do not simplify matters, but cause complexity. We prove that the core can be empty under enemies aversion and the strict core can be empty under friends appreciation. Furthermore, we show that under both preferences, deciding whether the strict core is nonempty, is NPNP-complete. This complexity extends to the core under enemies aversion. We also show that under friends appreciation, we can always find a core stable coalition structure in polynomial time.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017
EditorsCarles Sierra
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages359-365
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9780999241103
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017
Event26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017 - Melbourne, Australia
Duration: Aug 19 2017Aug 25 2017

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume0
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Other

Other26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017
CountryAustralia
CityMelbourne
Period8/19/178/25/17

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

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