TY - GEN
T1 - Cryptanalysis of randomized arithmetic codes based on markov model
AU - Zhao, Liang
AU - Nishide, Takashi
AU - Adhikari, Avishek
AU - Rhee, Kyung Hyune
AU - Sakurai, Kouichi
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - An improvement of arithmetic coding based on Markov model () has been proposed in the paper (Duan L.L., Liao X. F., Xiang T., Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation, 2011, 16(6):2554-2562). Though, a methodology to construct the is proposed in the above mentioned paper, it really lacks the formal definition of the. In the current paper, we not only investigate the security analysis of the, but also put forward formal definitions of the as well as its different security notions. Based on those definitions, a chosen-plaintext attack is proposed to reveal the used pseudorandom bit sequence for the encryption under the condition that the same pseudorandom bit sequence is used to encrypt the different messages. We also show that the does not have indistinguishable encryptions under the ciphertext-only attack (i.e., does not have indistinguishable encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper) even if the different pseudorandom bit sequences are used to encrypt the different messages. Moreover, when the is combined with the randomized arithmetic code () (Grangetto M., Magli E., Olmo G., IEEE Trans. Multimedia, 2006 8(5):905-917), we also explore the insecurity of this combined encryption scheme. The analysis demonstrates that the + is also insecure. Finally, the simulated experimental results show the correctness of all the proposed attacks.
AB - An improvement of arithmetic coding based on Markov model () has been proposed in the paper (Duan L.L., Liao X. F., Xiang T., Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation, 2011, 16(6):2554-2562). Though, a methodology to construct the is proposed in the above mentioned paper, it really lacks the formal definition of the. In the current paper, we not only investigate the security analysis of the, but also put forward formal definitions of the as well as its different security notions. Based on those definitions, a chosen-plaintext attack is proposed to reveal the used pseudorandom bit sequence for the encryption under the condition that the same pseudorandom bit sequence is used to encrypt the different messages. We also show that the does not have indistinguishable encryptions under the ciphertext-only attack (i.e., does not have indistinguishable encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper) even if the different pseudorandom bit sequences are used to encrypt the different messages. Moreover, when the is combined with the randomized arithmetic code () (Grangetto M., Magli E., Olmo G., IEEE Trans. Multimedia, 2006 8(5):905-917), we also explore the insecurity of this combined encryption scheme. The analysis demonstrates that the + is also insecure. Finally, the simulated experimental results show the correctness of all the proposed attacks.
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-34704-7_24
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-34704-7_24
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85099426274
SN - 9783642347030
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 341
EP - 362
BT - Information Security and Cryptology - 7th International Conference, Inscrypt 2011, Revised Selected Papers
A2 - Wu, Chuan-Kun
A2 - Lin, Dongdai
A2 - Yung, Moti
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 7th China International Conference on Information Security and Cryptography, Inscrypt 2011
Y2 - 30 November 2011 through 3 December 2011
ER -