Dangerous drivers foster social dilemma structures hidden behind a traffic flow with lane changes

Jun Tanimoto, Takuya Fujiki, Zhen Wang, Aya Hagishima, Naoki Ikegaya

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Motivated by the fact that there are quite a few ill-mannered drivers who disregard traffic rules concerning lane-changing and maximum speed, we investigated an interesting question: whether or not social dilemma structures can be formed from a frequent dangerous lane-changing attitude in a typical traffic flow without any explicit bottlenecks. In our model system, two classes of driver-agents coexist: C agents (cooperative strategy) always keep to traffic regulations with respect to lane-changing and speed, while D agents (defective strategy) disregard them to move ahead. In relatively high-density flows, such as the metastable and high-density phases, we found structures that correspond to either n-person Prisoner's Dilemma (n-PD) games or to quasi-PD games. In these situations, existing ill-mannered drivers create heavy traffic jams that reduce social efficiency.

Original languageEnglish
Article numberP11027
JournalJournal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment
Volume2014
Issue number11
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 1 2014

Fingerprint

Social Dilemma
Traffic Flow
traffic
Driver
games
Traffic
Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Traffic Jam
Heavy Traffic
Person
Game
Social dilemma
Traffic flow
Strategy
Model

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Cite this

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