Deep False-Name-Proof Auction Mechanisms

Yuko Sakurai, Satoshi Oyama, Mingyu Guo, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We explore an approach to designing false-name-proof auction mechanisms using deep learning. While multi-agent systems researchers have recently proposed data-driven approaches to automatically designing auction mechanisms through deep learning, false-name-proofness, which generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidder can submit multiple bids under fictitious identifiers, has not been taken into account as a property that a mechanism has to satisfy. We extend the RegretNet neural network architecture to incorporate false-name-proof constraints and then conduct experiments demonstrating that the generated mechanisms satisfy false-name-proofness.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPRIMA 2019
Subtitle of host publicationPrinciples and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 22nd International Conference, Proceedings
EditorsMatteo Baldoni, Mehdi Dastani, Beishui Liao, Yuko Sakurai, Rym Zalila Wenkstern
PublisherSpringer
Pages594-601
Number of pages8
ISBN (Print)9783030337919
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2019
Event22nd International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2019 - Turin, Italy
Duration: Oct 28 2019Oct 31 2019

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume11873 LNAI
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference22nd International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2019
CountryItaly
CityTurin
Period10/28/1910/31/19

Fingerprint

Auctions
Network architecture
Multi agent systems
Strategy-proofness
Neural networks
Network Architecture
Data-driven
Multi-agent Systems
Experiments
Neural Networks
Generalise
False
Deep learning
Experiment
Learning

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Sakurai, Y., Oyama, S., Guo, M., & Yokoo, M. (2019). Deep False-Name-Proof Auction Mechanisms. In M. Baldoni, M. Dastani, B. Liao, Y. Sakurai, & R. Zalila Wenkstern (Eds.), PRIMA 2019: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 22nd International Conference, Proceedings (pp. 594-601). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11873 LNAI). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33792-6_45

Deep False-Name-Proof Auction Mechanisms. / Sakurai, Yuko; Oyama, Satoshi; Guo, Mingyu; Yokoo, Makoto.

PRIMA 2019: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 22nd International Conference, Proceedings. ed. / Matteo Baldoni; Mehdi Dastani; Beishui Liao; Yuko Sakurai; Rym Zalila Wenkstern. Springer, 2019. p. 594-601 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11873 LNAI).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Sakurai, Y, Oyama, S, Guo, M & Yokoo, M 2019, Deep False-Name-Proof Auction Mechanisms. in M Baldoni, M Dastani, B Liao, Y Sakurai & R Zalila Wenkstern (eds), PRIMA 2019: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 22nd International Conference, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 11873 LNAI, Springer, pp. 594-601, 22nd International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2019, Turin, Italy, 10/28/19. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33792-6_45
Sakurai Y, Oyama S, Guo M, Yokoo M. Deep False-Name-Proof Auction Mechanisms. In Baldoni M, Dastani M, Liao B, Sakurai Y, Zalila Wenkstern R, editors, PRIMA 2019: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 22nd International Conference, Proceedings. Springer. 2019. p. 594-601. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33792-6_45
Sakurai, Yuko ; Oyama, Satoshi ; Guo, Mingyu ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Deep False-Name-Proof Auction Mechanisms. PRIMA 2019: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 22nd International Conference, Proceedings. editor / Matteo Baldoni ; Mehdi Dastani ; Beishui Liao ; Yuko Sakurai ; Rym Zalila Wenkstern. Springer, 2019. pp. 594-601 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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