Defection-free exchange mechanisms for information goods

S. Matsubara, M. Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Internet and agent technologies have facilitated worldwide trade, but we sometimes encounter risky situations in the process of exchange involving goods and money, i.e., fraud. This problem is becoming more serious with the growing popularity of person-to-person trade. One solution is the imposition of an entry fee. However if the entry fee is too expensive, this would discourage newcomers from starting deals. To resolve the conflict between safety and convenience, we have developed two kinds of exchange mechanisms that guarantee against defection from a contract. One reduces the entry fee by integrating multiple deals and controlling goods and money flows. The other reduces the entry fee by incorporating a third party agent into the exchange process. We examine the lower bound of the entry fee for each of these mechanisms and provide a calculation method that is able to obtain this value in linear time.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 4th International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, ICMAS 2000
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages183-190
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)0769506259, 9780769506258
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2000
Externally publishedYes
Event4th International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, ICMAS 2000 - Boston, United States
Duration: Jul 10 2000Jul 12 2000

Publication series

NameProceedings - 4th International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, ICMAS 2000

Other

Other4th International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, ICMAS 2000
CountryUnited States
CityBoston
Period7/10/007/12/00

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Internet

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Control and Systems Engineering

Cite this

Matsubara, S., & Yokoo, M. (2000). Defection-free exchange mechanisms for information goods. In Proceedings - 4th International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, ICMAS 2000 (pp. 183-190). [858452] (Proceedings - 4th International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, ICMAS 2000). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICMAS.2000.858452

Defection-free exchange mechanisms for information goods. / Matsubara, S.; Yokoo, M.

Proceedings - 4th International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, ICMAS 2000. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2000. p. 183-190 858452 (Proceedings - 4th International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, ICMAS 2000).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Matsubara, S & Yokoo, M 2000, Defection-free exchange mechanisms for information goods. in Proceedings - 4th International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, ICMAS 2000., 858452, Proceedings - 4th International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, ICMAS 2000, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 183-190, 4th International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, ICMAS 2000, Boston, United States, 7/10/00. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICMAS.2000.858452
Matsubara S, Yokoo M. Defection-free exchange mechanisms for information goods. In Proceedings - 4th International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, ICMAS 2000. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2000. p. 183-190. 858452. (Proceedings - 4th International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, ICMAS 2000). https://doi.org/10.1109/ICMAS.2000.858452
Matsubara, S. ; Yokoo, M. / Defection-free exchange mechanisms for information goods. Proceedings - 4th International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, ICMAS 2000. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2000. pp. 183-190 (Proceedings - 4th International Conference on MultiAgent Systems, ICMAS 2000).
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