Determining bidding strategies in sequential auctions: Quasi-linear utility and budget constraints

H. Hattori, Makoto Yokoo, Y. Sakurai, T. Shintani

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a new method for finding an optimal bidding strategy in sequential auctions, using a dynamic programming technique. The existing method assumes the utility of a user is represented in an additive form. Thus, the remaining endowment of money must be explicitly represented in each state. On the other hand, our method assumes the utility of a user can be represented in a quasi-linear form, and representing the payment as a state-transition cost. Accordingly, we can obtain more than an m-fold speed-up in the computation time, where m is the initial endowment of money. Furthermore, we have developed a method for obtaining a semi-optimal bidding strategy under budget constraints.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents
EditorsJ.P. Muller, E. Andre, S. Sen, C. Frasson
Pages83-84
Number of pages2
Publication statusPublished - 2001
Externally publishedYes
EventFifth International Conference on Autonomous Agents - Montreal, Que., Canada
Duration: May 28 2001Jun 1 2001

Other

OtherFifth International Conference on Autonomous Agents
CountryCanada
CityMontreal, Que.
Period5/28/016/1/01

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Engineering(all)

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    Hattori, H., Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y., & Shintani, T. (2001). Determining bidding strategies in sequential auctions: Quasi-linear utility and budget constraints. In J. P. Muller, E. Andre, S. Sen, & C. Frasson (Eds.), Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents (pp. 83-84)