Differentiated standards and patent pools

Aaron Schiff, Reiko Aoki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider patent pool formation by owners of essential patents for differentiated standards that may be complements or substitutes in use. Pooling improves coordination in terms of royalty setting within a standard but provokes a strategic response from licensors in the competing standard. We characterise the incentives to form and defect from pools within standards and show how pool formation and stability depend on competition between standards. We also examine strategic patent pool formation by consortium standards and show that policies promoting compatibility of standards may increase or decrease welfare depending on the effects on the incentives to form pools.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)376
Number of pages1
JournalJournal of Industrial Economics
Volume62
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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