Diffusion and auction on graphs

Bin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally conflicting in auction design. For the first time, we expand the domain of the classic auction to a social graph and formally identify a new class of auction mechanisms on graphs. All mechanisms in this class are incentive-compatible and also promote all buyers to diffuse the auction information to others, whereby both the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency are significantly improved comparing with the Vickrey auction. It is found that the recently proposed information diffusion mechanism is an extreme case with the lowest revenue in this new class. Our work could potentially inspire a new perspective for the efficient and optimal auction design and could be applied into the prevalent online social and economic networks.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
EditorsSarit Kraus
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages435-441
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9780999241141
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2019
Event28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019 - Macao, China
Duration: Aug 10 2019Aug 16 2019

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume2019-August
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Conference

Conference28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
CountryChina
CityMacao
Period8/10/198/16/19

Fingerprint

Resource allocation
Economics
Optimal design

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Li, B., Hao, D., Zhao, D., & Yokoo, M. (2019). Diffusion and auction on graphs. In S. Kraus (Ed.), Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019 (pp. 435-441). (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence; Vol. 2019-August). International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence.

Diffusion and auction on graphs. / Li, Bin; Hao, Dong; Zhao, Dengji; Yokoo, Makoto.

Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019. ed. / Sarit Kraus. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2019. p. 435-441 (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence; Vol. 2019-August).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Li, B, Hao, D, Zhao, D & Yokoo, M 2019, Diffusion and auction on graphs. in S Kraus (ed.), Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019. IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2019-August, International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 435-441, 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019, Macao, China, 8/10/19.
Li B, Hao D, Zhao D, Yokoo M. Diffusion and auction on graphs. In Kraus S, editor, Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence. 2019. p. 435-441. (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence).
Li, Bin ; Hao, Dong ; Zhao, Dengji ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Diffusion and auction on graphs. Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019. editor / Sarit Kraus. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2019. pp. 435-441 (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence).
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