Abstract
Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally conflicting in auction design. For the first time, we expand the domain of the classic auction to a social graph and formally identify a new class of auction mechanisms on graphs. All mechanisms in this class are incentive-compatible and also promote all buyers to diffuse the auction information to others, whereby both the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency are significantly improved comparing with the Vickrey auction. It is found that the recently proposed information diffusion mechanism is an extreme case with the lowest revenue in this new class. Our work could potentially inspire a new perspective for the efficient and optimal auction design and could be applied into the prevalent online social and economic networks.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019 |
| Editors | Sarit Kraus |
| Publisher | International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence |
| Pages | 435-441 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780999241141 |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 1 2019 |
| Event | 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019 - Macao, China Duration: Aug 10 2019 → Aug 16 2019 |
Publication series
| Name | IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2019-August |
| ISSN (Print) | 1045-0823 |
Conference
| Conference | 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019 |
|---|---|
| Country | China |
| City | Macao |
| Period | 8/10/19 → 8/16/19 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Artificial Intelligence
Cite this
Diffusion and auction on graphs. / Li, Bin; Hao, Dong; Zhao, Dengji; Yokoo, Makoto.
Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019. ed. / Sarit Kraus. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2019. p. 435-441 (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence; Vol. 2019-August).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Diffusion and auction on graphs
AU - Li, Bin
AU - Hao, Dong
AU - Zhao, Dengji
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
PY - 2019/1/1
Y1 - 2019/1/1
N2 - Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally conflicting in auction design. For the first time, we expand the domain of the classic auction to a social graph and formally identify a new class of auction mechanisms on graphs. All mechanisms in this class are incentive-compatible and also promote all buyers to diffuse the auction information to others, whereby both the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency are significantly improved comparing with the Vickrey auction. It is found that the recently proposed information diffusion mechanism is an extreme case with the lowest revenue in this new class. Our work could potentially inspire a new perspective for the efficient and optimal auction design and could be applied into the prevalent online social and economic networks.
AB - Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally conflicting in auction design. For the first time, we expand the domain of the classic auction to a social graph and formally identify a new class of auction mechanisms on graphs. All mechanisms in this class are incentive-compatible and also promote all buyers to diffuse the auction information to others, whereby both the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency are significantly improved comparing with the Vickrey auction. It is found that the recently proposed information diffusion mechanism is an extreme case with the lowest revenue in this new class. Our work could potentially inspire a new perspective for the efficient and optimal auction design and could be applied into the prevalent online social and economic networks.
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M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85074901456
T3 - IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
SP - 435
EP - 441
BT - Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
A2 - Kraus, Sarit
PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
ER -