TY - GEN
T1 - Diffusion and auction on graphs
AU - Li, Bin
AU - Hao, Dong
AU - Zhao, Dengji
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NNSFC) Grant Number 71601029 and JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP17H00761.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally conflicting in auction design. For the first time, we expand the domain of the classic auction to a social graph and formally identify a new class of auction mechanisms on graphs. All mechanisms in this class are incentive-compatible and also promote all buyers to diffuse the auction information to others, whereby both the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency are significantly improved comparing with the Vickrey auction. It is found that the recently proposed information diffusion mechanism is an extreme case with the lowest revenue in this new class. Our work could potentially inspire a new perspective for the efficient and optimal auction design and could be applied into the prevalent online social and economic networks.
AB - Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally conflicting in auction design. For the first time, we expand the domain of the classic auction to a social graph and formally identify a new class of auction mechanisms on graphs. All mechanisms in this class are incentive-compatible and also promote all buyers to diffuse the auction information to others, whereby both the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency are significantly improved comparing with the Vickrey auction. It is found that the recently proposed information diffusion mechanism is an extreme case with the lowest revenue in this new class. Our work could potentially inspire a new perspective for the efficient and optimal auction design and could be applied into the prevalent online social and economic networks.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85074901456&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85074901456&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.24963/ijcai.2019/62
DO - 10.24963/ijcai.2019/62
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85074901456
T3 - IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
SP - 435
EP - 441
BT - Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
A2 - Kraus, Sarit
PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
T2 - 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
Y2 - 10 August 2019 through 16 August 2019
ER -