Diffusion and auction on graphs

Bin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally conflicting in auction design. For the first time, we expand the domain of the classic auction to a social graph and formally identify a new class of auction mechanisms on graphs. All mechanisms in this class are incentive-compatible and also promote all buyers to diffuse the auction information to others, whereby both the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency are significantly improved comparing with the Vickrey auction. It is found that the recently proposed information diffusion mechanism is an extreme case with the lowest revenue in this new class. Our work could potentially inspire a new perspective for the efficient and optimal auction design and could be applied into the prevalent online social and economic networks.

Original languageEnglish
JournalUnknown Journal
Publication statusPublished - May 23 2019

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General

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