Dilemma game structure observed in traffic flow at a 2-to-1 lane junction

Atsuo Yamauchi, Jun Tanimoto, Aya Hagishima, Hiroki Sagara

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

39 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Using a cellular automaton traffic model based on the stochastic optimal velocity model with appropriate assumptions for both incoming and outgoing vehicle boundaries, the so-called bottleneck issue on a lane-closing section was investigated in terms of game theory. In the system, two classified driver agents coexist: C agents (cooperative strategy) always driving in the first lane and D agents (defective strategy) trying to drive in a lower-density lane whether the first or the second lane. In high-density flow, D agents' interruption into the first lane from the second just before the lane-closing section creates a heavier traffic jam, which reduces social efficiency. This particular event can be described with a prisoner's dilemma game structure.

Original languageEnglish
Article number036104
JournalPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
Volume79
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 3 2009

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Condensed Matter Physics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Dilemma game structure observed in traffic flow at a 2-to-1 lane junction'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this