Direct Reciprocity in Spatial Populations Enhances R-Reciprocity As Well As ST-Reciprocity

Kohei Miyaji, Jun Tanimoto, Zhen Wang, Aya Hagishima, Naoki Ikegaya

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

As is well-known, spatial reciprocity plays an important role in facilitating the emergence of cooperative traits, and the effect of direct reciprocity is also obvious for explaining the cooperation dynamics. However, how the combination of these two scenarios influences cooperation is still unclear. In the present work, we study the evolution of cooperation in 2×2 games via considering both spatial structured populations and direct reciprocity driven by the strategy with 1-memory length. Our results show that cooperation can be significantly facilitated on the whole parameter plane. For prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation dominates the system even at strong dilemma, where maximal social payoff is still realized. In this sense, R-reciprocity forms and it is robust to the extremely strong dilemma. Interestingly, when turning to chicken game, we find that ST-reciprocity is also guaranteed, through which social average payoff and cooperation is greatly enhanced. This reciprocity mechanism is supported by mean-field analysis and different interaction topologies. Thus, our study indicates that direct reciprocity in structured populations can be regarded as a more powerful factor for the sustainability of cooperation.

Original languageEnglish
Article numbere71961
JournalPloS one
Volume8
Issue number8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 7 2013

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Sustainable development
Topology
Data storage equipment
topology
Population
cooperatives
Chickens
chickens
Prisoner Dilemma

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)

Cite this

Direct Reciprocity in Spatial Populations Enhances R-Reciprocity As Well As ST-Reciprocity. / Miyaji, Kohei; Tanimoto, Jun; Wang, Zhen; Hagishima, Aya; Ikegaya, Naoki.

In: PloS one, Vol. 8, No. 8, e71961, 07.08.2013.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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